Beyond black and white: The complex morality of lying

Josh Gordon explores the complex nature of honesty and deception. He shares a personal anecdote about a ‘white lie’ told by his mother, illustrating that morality isn’t always black and white. The article delves into behavioural science, citing studies by psychologists and behavioural scientists like Bella DePaulo and Dan Ariely. These studies reveal that people lie to avoid unnecessary harm or when deception aligns with their moral code. Through experiments, the article examines various contexts where lying is deemed acceptable or ethical, challenging the simplistic notion that lying is universally wrong. It concludes that human morality and honesty are nuanced, guided more by personal judgment than absolute truths. The article was first published on FirstRand Perspectives.

Ethical lies

By Josh Gordon

Lying is wrong, except when it isn’t, and morality is not as black and white as we sometimes like to believe. Scientifically.

One of my earliest memories is when my mother, to her embarrassment, forgot about a doctor’s appointment. Calling the doctor to reschedule, she made up an excuse supported by fictitious car troubles. Confronted by my innocent question from the back of a perfectly functioning car, “Wasn’t that a lie?”, I was introduced to a white lie. In the years since this incident, I would like to believe that I have not abused the concept, but I would be lying if I said I had never used it. Sometimes tactfully, sometimes not. However, the lessons my parents and educators instilled in me, that lying is wrong, still dominate my moral compass – a view most likely shared by most people throughout the ages. It is not hard to rationalise why lying is universally condemned. Any community where lying was the norm or adherence to the truth was optional would have a hard time functioning. Trust would be non-existent, social cohesion would be difficult, and long-term planning or cooperation would be futile. The evolutionary imperative to be trustworthy and truthful is strong.

Despite this intuitive truth, people seem to struggle to apply it consistently. Psychologist Bella DePaulo found that it is not unusual for people to rack up a few lies throughout the day. These lies can be any combination of my mother’s white lie, a reaffirmation to a partner that their “bum does not look big in those jeans”, or a full-blown lie like “I did not have sexual relations with that woman”.

The reasoning behind dishonesty has been studied extensively in behavioural science. Two themes, unnecessary harm and consequences, influence dishonest behaviour significantly. These themes often act as some form of justification or extenuating circumstance that consolidate and make consistent one’s ‘need’ to lie and the associated guilt of betraying one’s moral code.

Emma Levine, a professor of behavioural science at Chicago University, studies deception through field experiments. Levine concludes that a typical lie is often well reasoned, intentional, and justified by the deceiver when telling the truth would have little or no instrumental value or when the truth would harm someone unnecessarily.

To understand how people define ‘unnecessary harm’, Levine ran an experiment in which she asked some research participants to explain when they would prefer being lied to and asked others when they would consider lying ethical. Seven community standards, across three dimensions for when a lie is justified, were established (the person lying, the person being lied to and the context of the lie).

Generally, people find it acceptable to lie when the deceived person is emotionally fragile, cannot understand the context of the lie, or is at the end of their life. Being dishonest is also justified when the information is trivial, where the information cannot be controlled, or when being honest would disrupt the deceived person’s life or embarrass them in front of others. A common thread is that people will lie where unnecessary harm can be avoided. In these circumstances, people consider deception more ethical than honesty and prefer being lied to over being told the truth.

People also justify dishonest behaviour when the consequences of deception align with their moral code. Dan Ariely, a behavioural scientist from Duke University, describes a dishonesty experiment that sheds some light on this theme. The experiment is relatively simple. Research participants roll a standard six-sided die, and before the die is rolled, they are asked to silently choose whether the top or bottom number of the die will be higher. After the die is rolled, the research participant tells the experimenter which side of the die they chose and is then paid a small amount of money based on the number on that side of the die. They would receive a larger payout if the side they chose was the higher number.

A perfectly honest participant who chooses a side before rolling the die and then faithfully reports their choice, no matter the roll’s outcome, should choose the more favourable side of the die (with a higher payoff) about half of the time. Conversely, a thoroughly dishonest person will always report the higher side of the die, regardless of the choice before rolling.

Unsurprisingly, Ariely reports that people tend to cheat at least some of the time. Research participants choose the more favourable side of the die at a rate higher than what would be expected by chance.

In a twist to this experiment, Ariely attached a lie detector to research participants while playing the game. Ariely found that the lie detector could generally detect when participants were choosing a side of the die dishonestly. But then Ariely introduced another measure to the game that highlighted how doing something ‘good’ could impair an individual’s honesty.

Instead of winning money for themselves, participants were told that the money that they earned would go to a charity of their choice. In this version of the experiment, research participants lied more often to get a more significant financial reward. However, interestingly, the lie detector could no longer reliably establish when participants were dishonest.

Ariely explains these results; “The lie detector detects tension ‘I want more money, but I think it’s wrong’. But, if it’s not wrong, why would you worry? If it’s for a good cause, you can still think you’re a good person”. This notion highlights the importance of consequences in any decision to be dishonest. Being dishonest as an act of altruism is not considered wrong and is morally justified by participants.

The black-and-white lies we like to draw when we concern ourselves with questions about morality and honesty are not as transparent as we sometimes believe. To be human is to consistently operate in uncertain and complex environments where our only absolute truth source is our judgment. Lying is wrong, except when it isn’t.